Using Simon's Algorithm to Attack Symmetric-Key Cryptographic Primitives by Santoli, Thomas & Schaffner, Christian
ar
X
iv
:1
60
3.
07
85
6v
3 
 [q
ua
nt-
ph
]  
31
 Ja
n 2
01
7 USING SIMON’S ALGORITHM TO ATTACK SYMMETRIC-KEY
CRYPTOGRAPHIC PRIMITIVES
THOMAS SANTOLIa
Mathematical Institute, University of Oxford;
Andrew Wiles Building, Radcliffe Observatory Quarter
Woodstock Road, Oxford, OX2 6GG
CHRISTIAN SCHAFFNERb
ILLC, University of Amsterdam
Centrum Wiskunde & Informatica (CWI)
QuSoft
P.O. Box 94242, 1090 GE Amsterdam, Netherlands
We present new connections between quantum information and the field of classical
cryptography. In particular, we provide examples where Simon’s algorithm can be used to
show insecurity of commonly used cryptographic symmetric-key primitives. Specifically,
these examples consist of a quantum distinguisher for the 3-round Feistel network and a
forgery attack on CBC-MAC which forges a tag for a chosen-prefix message querying only
other messages (of the same length). We assume that an adversary has quantum-oracle
access to the respective classical primitives. Similar results have been achieved recently
in independent work by Kaplan et al. [KLLNP16]. Our findings shed new light on the
post-quantum security of cryptographic schemes and underline that classical security
proofs of cryptographic constructions need to be revisited in light of quantum attackers.
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1 Introduction
The main goal of cryptography is secure communication. While encryption ensures the se-
crecy of a message, its integrity is guaranteed by means of authentication. In private-key
cryptography, it is assumed that honest players Alice and Bob share a private key unknown
to any attacker. The situation is symmetric between Alice and Bob, hence this scenario is
also referred to as symmetric cryptography. Here, private-key encryption (e.g. the Advanced
Encryption Standard AES in a certain encryption mode) can be used to ensure secrecy of a
message, while Message-Authentication Codes (MACs) allow to verify that a message origi-
nated from the secret-key holder and that the message has not been altered in transit. Cryp-
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tographic research has come up with satisfactory solutions for these tasks, but even if we
assume that these problems are solved, the problem of pre-establishing secret keys remains.
In groundbreaking work, very elegant solutions to this key-establishing problem have been
suggested by Merkle [Mer78] and Diffie and Hellman [DH76]. The key idea is to split the key
up into a public and private part, where only the latter needs to be kept secretc. However,
compared to private-key cryptography, public-key cryptoschemes often require some richer
mathematical structure which makes them more vulnerable to attacks.
Post-quantum cryptography [BBD09]dstudies the security of cryptographic systems against
quantum attackers. Most currently used public-key systems (such as RSA [RSA78] or elliptic-
curve cryptography) are known to be insecure against attackers with large-scale quantum
computers, because their security relies on the hardness of mathematical problems such as
factoring large integer numbers or taking discrete logarithms. For these problems, there
is an exponential gap between the quantum and classicalerunning times of the best-known
algorithms: these problems can be solved in polynomial time by Shor’s algorithm [Sho94] on
a large enough quantum computer, whereas we do not know of any polynomial-time classical
algorithms for them.
In light of the fact that quantum algorithms break most of currently used public-key
cryptography, it is natural to study the impact of quantum attacks also on private-key (or
symmetric) cryptosystems. However, not much is known about the security of cryptographic
primitives (such as hash functions or encryption schemes) under the assumption that an
attack may involve quantum queries to the primitive. So, for example, apart from querying
the primitive on a single input, a quantum adversary is allowed to query it on a superposition
of inputs. Such a model is easily justified in case of a hash function [BDF+11] which is given by
a classical algorithm. That algorithm can then be run on a quantum superposition of possible
inputs. Other settings of superposition queries have been considered as well [BZ13b, DFNS14,
BZ13a, GHS16]. The common belief so far was that quantum attacks on symmetric primitives
are of minor concern, as they mainly consist of employing Grover’s algorithm [Gro96] to
generically speed up search (sub-)problems, for instance for finding collisions in hash functions.
Grover search usually allows to get at most a quadratic improvement in the number of queries
required to attack the primitive, see for instance [KLLNP16] for recent cryptanalytic results
in this direction. In these cases, doubling the security parameter (such as the bit-size of the
output of the hash function) would be a simple solution to overcome quantum attacks.
In this article, we exhibit two examples of commonly used classical symmetric-key cryp-
tographic primitives which have well-established classical security proofs showing that an
exponential number of queries is required for an attack. However, we demonstrate that se-
curity is broken by a quantum attacker which only makes a polynomial number of quantum
queries. This is a similar exponential gap between classical and quantum security as in the
devastating attacks using Shor’s algorithm in the public-key setting. Our results shed new
light on the relation between quantum information and classical cryptography, suggesting that
cIn fact, public-key cryptography was invented already in the early 70s by Ellis, Cocks and Williams at the
British intelligence agency GHCQ, but these works had been classified until 1997.
dThe term is quite well-established by now, but chosen somewhat unfortunately, because the research area is
concerned with cryptography which is still secure at the beginning and not after the end of the era of large-scale
quantum computers.
eHere and throughout the article, we will use the term classical as synonym for non-quantum.
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many classical cryptographic security proofs have been carried out in an incomplete (namely
classical) security model and need to be revisited in the light of the currently most accurate
description of Nature, which is quantum mechanics.
1.1 Simon’s Algorithm
Simon’s algorithm was proposed in 1994 [Sim94] as first quantum algorithm exhibiting an
exponential speedup in query complexity compared to any classical algorithm (in the bounded-
error setting). It solves the following problem: given a function f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n with
the promise that for some s ∈ {0, 1}n, it holds that [f(x) = f(y)]⇔ [x⊕ y ∈ {0n, s}], find the
n-bit string s. It can be shown [MW16] that any classical algorithm requires Ω(2n/2) classical
queries to f in order to find s, whereas Simon’s algorithm succeeds using only O(n) quantum
queries to f . The quantum part of Simon’s algorithm consists of executing the following
circuit:
|0〉 /n H⊗n
Uf
H⊗n
|0〉 /n
where the quantum query to the classical function f is formalized in the standard way by a
unitary transform
Uf |x〉 |y〉 = |x〉 |y ⊕ f(x)〉 (1)
where ⊕ denotes bitwise addition modulo 2.
The first Hadamard operation leads to the state
∑
x∈{0,1}n |x〉 |0〉, which after querying
f becomes
∑
x∈{0,1}n |x〉 |f(x)〉. Measuring the second register gives a random outcome f(x)
and collapses the first register to 1√
2
(|x〉 + |x⊕ s〉) because of the promised structure of f .
Applying another Hadamard transform leads to the state
∑
y∈{0,1}n(−1)y·x(1 + (−1)y·s) |y〉.
Note that for y ∈ {0, 1}n with y · s = y1s1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ ynsn = 1, we have destructive interference
and the amplitudes of those strings y vanish. Therefore, measuring the register will result in
a (random) n-bit string y with the property that y · s = 0. Running this quantum procedure
O(n) of times results in a full-rank system of linear equations which can be solved efficiently
classically to obtain the string s.
1.2 Our Contributions
In this article, we observe that requiring only the forward implication of Simon’s promise
x = y ⊕ s ⇒ f(x) = f(y) suffices for Simon’s subroutine to give a j such that j · s = 0.
The difference between this weakened condition and full Simon’s promise is that we cannot
bound the number of runs of the subroutine which are required in order to get an independent
system of n such equations, and there are cases in which such an independent system cannot
be obtained at all.
Our contributions build on a technique developed by Kuwakado and Morii. They make
clever use of Simon’s algorithm to distinguish a three-round Feistel construction with internal
permutations from a random permutation (see explanations below) [KM10], and to recover
the key in the Evan-Mansour encryption scheme [KM12]. In Section 3, we slightly extend the
result from [KM10]. Using our observation above, we can relax the assumption from [KM10]
that the internal functions have to be permutations, replacing them with arbitrary functions.
Using random functions (instead of permutations) is relevant in the application where a
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Feistel network is used to convert pseudorandom functions into pseudorandom permutations.
In Section 4 we present the main new result of this article, a quantum forgery attack on a
commonly used scheme for message authentication called CBC-MAC (of fixed-size messages).
In our attack, we assume an adversary to be able to query arbitrary quantum superpositions
of messages, provided these do not contain the message for which she forges a tag in the end.
In fact, our attack also applies to an extension of the basic CBC-MAC to arbitrary-length
messages by prepending the length of the message.
1.3 Related work
Concurrent to this work, very similar results to ours are presented in a recent article by
Kaplan, Leurent, Leverrier, and Naya-Plasencia [KLLNP16]. While there has been an initial
exchange of ideas in early stages of the work, the communication stopped after a while and
our respective results have been obtained independently.
One difference between our work and [KLLNP16] is that we use different ways to handle
the case in which Simon’s promise is not fully satisfied, that is when there is an s such
that f(x) = f(x ⊕ s) for all inputs s, but there can be unwanted collisions f(x) = f(y)
where y 6∈ {x, x⊕ s}. These unwanted collisions may increase the number of runs of Simon’s
subroutine needed to obtain an independent system of equations. We observe that this does
not constitute a problem when it comes to distinguishing f from a random function. Instead,
the authors of [KLLNP16] give a more general analysis of Simon’s algorithm, and introduce
a quantity to measure the number of the aforementioned unwanted collisions, and they show
how to bound the number of needed repetitions of the subroutine in terms of this quantity.
Another difference between our works is the variant of CBC-MAC which we analyze. In
our attack, we focus on MACs for fixed-size messages. In particular, we manage to forge a
tag for a message (with a chosen prefix) by querying the MAC with messages of the same
length. In [KLLNP16], they consider a slight variant of the basic CBC-MAC which can handle
arbitrary-size messages by using two separate keys. While we show how to forge a tag for a
message in which each block is non-zero by querying only messages which have at least one
block of zeros, what they do is showing how to forge a tag for a message which is strictly
longer than all messages queried in their attack.
Moreover, the results from [KLLNP16] illustrate that Simon’s algorithm can be used to
break not only CBC-MAC, but a whole range of modes of operation for authentication and
authenticated encryption. Furthermore, Simon’s algorithm can be used to speed up slide
attacks, a cryptanalytic technique against classical symmetric cryptoschemes.
2 Pseudorandom Functions and Permutations
In this section, we provide formal definitions and statements about classical cryptography,
following the lines of [KL07].
In the following, we consider keyed functions. These are two-input functions F : {0, 1}∗×
{0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}∗. Given a keyed function F , we say that it is efficient if there exists a
polynomial-time algorithm which computes F (k, x) given k and x as inputs, and we say that
it is length-preserving if it accepts only pairs of inputs (k, x) where k and x have the same
length, and if also the output F (k, x) has this same length.
For each n ∈ N, let Funcn be the set of all functions mapping n-bit strings to n-bit strings.
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A length-preserving keyed function F induces a distribution on Funcn, given by randomly
choosing k ← {0, 1}n and then considering the single-input function Fk(·) := F (k, ·).
Intuitively we say that F is pseudorandom if, choosing k at random in {0, 1}n, the function
Fk cannot be efficiently distinguished from a function f chosen uniformly at random from the
set of all functions Funcn. In order to give the formal definition of pseudorandom function,
we use the notion of oracle-distinguisher, which consists of an algorithm DO(·) having access
to an oracle function O(·). This means that in one time step, D can query the oracle at a
point x, obtaining the value of O(x).
Definition 1. Let F : {0, 1}∗ × {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}∗ be an efficient length-preserving keyed
function. We call F a pseudorandom function if for any probabilistic polynomial-time oracle-
distinguisher D there exists a negligible function negl(n) such that
∣∣∣ Pr
k←{0,1}n
[DFk(·)(1n) = 1]− Pr
f←Funcn
[Df(·)(1n) = 1]
∣∣∣ ≤ negl(n)
where a negligible function is one which grows slower than any inverse polynomial in n.
An efficient length-preserving function F : {0, 1}∗ × {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}∗ is called keyed
permutation if for every n and for every k ∈ {0, 1}n the function Fk(·) : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n
is a permutation (that is, a bijection). A keyed permutation is called efficient if there are
polynomial-time algorithms which, on inputs k and x, compute Fk(x) and F
−1
k (x) respectively.
Let Permn be the set of all permutations of {0, 1}n. In the same way as a length-preserving
keyed function induces a distribution on Funcn, a keyed permutation induces a distribution
on Permn. This leads to the definition of pseudorandom permutations, analogous to pseudo-
random functions:
Definition 2. Let F : {0, 1}∗ × {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}∗ be an efficient keyed permutation. We call
F a pseudorandom permutation if for any probabilistic polynomial-time oracle-distinguisher
D there exists a negligible function negl(n) such that
∣∣∣ Pr
k←{0,1}n
[DFk(·)(1n) = 1]− Pr
π←Permn
[Dπ(·)(1n) = 1]
∣∣∣ ≤ negl(n).
We can use the Feistel construction to build a pseudorandom permutation from a pseu-
dorandom function:
Theorem 3. [LR88] If F is a pseudorandom function, then the 3-round Feistel network (as in
Figure 1) with internal round functions Fk1 , Fk2 , Fk3 is a pseudorandom permutation mapping
2n-bit strings to 2n-bit strings, and using a key k = k1||k2||k3 of length 3n.
The notion of pseudorandomness of classical functions can be generalized to a post-
quantum setting, where we assume that adversaries are allowed to perform quantum com-
putation. In this context, we consider quantum oracle-distinguishers. A quantum oracle-
distinguisher is a quantum algorithm D|O(·)〉 which is allowed to make quantum queries of
the form |x, y〉 7→ |x, y ⊕O(x)〉. This means that D can evaluate the function O(·) not only
on classical inputs, but also on superpositions of classical inputs. This leads to the following
quantum generalizations of pseudorandomness:
Definition 4. Let F : {0, 1}∗ × {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}∗ be an efficient length-preserving keyed
function. We call F a quantum pseudorandom function if for any polynomial-time quantum
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oracle-distinguisher D there exists a negligible function negl(n) such that∣∣∣ Pr
k←{0,1}n
[D|Fk(·)〉(1n) = 1]− Pr
f←Funcn
[D|f(·)〉(1n) = 1]
∣∣∣ ≤ negl(n).
If F : {0, 1}∗ × {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}∗ is an efficient keyed permutation, we call it a quantum
pseudorandom permutation if for any polynomial-time quantum oracle-distinguisher D there
exists a negligible function negl(n) such that∣∣∣ Pr
k←{0,1}n
[D|Fk(·)〉(1n) = 1]− Pr
π←Permn
[D|π(·)〉(1n) = 1]
∣∣∣ ≤ negl(n).
Quantum pseudorandomness is a strictly stronger requirement than classical pseudoran-
domness. For example, by the distinguisher which we showed in Section 3, the 3-round Feistel
network is not a quantum pseudorandom permutation, while by Theorem 3 it is a classical
pseudorandom permutation.
3 Quantum distinguisher for the 3-round Feistel network
A Feistel network is a common cryptographic way of building block ciphers. Block ciphers
are the basic building blocks of encryption schemes. Ideally, a block cipher with block size
n bits behaves like a fully random permutation from {0, 1}n to {0, 1}n. Many block ciphers
such as DES (Data Encryption Standard) are based on a Feistel construction.
A Feistel network operates in a series of k rounds where internal randomizing functions
P1, . . . , Pk (from n bits to n bits) are cleverly put together to result in a permutation. More
specifically, if the input of the i-th round is Li−1||Ri−1 ∈ {0, 1}2n, the output produced by
the round is Li||Ri ∈ {0, 1}2n defined by Li := Ri−1 and Ri := Li−1⊕Pi(Ri−1), see Figure 1.
Interestingly, this classical cryptographic construction is not alien to quantum information
theorists, as it is akin to the standard way of implementing a classical function Pi in a
unitary way as in Equation (1).
Thus, a k-round Feistel network takes an input L0||R0 ∈ {0, 1}2n and produces an output
Lk||Rk ∈ {0, 1}2n by subsequently executing the round functions. One important feature of
Feistel networks is that, regardless of the internal functions P1, . . . , Pk, the resulting function
L0||R0 7→ Lk||Rk is always a permutation. Indeed, in order to invert the function one only
needs to reverse the construction without the need of computing the inverse of the internal
functions P1, . . . , Pk (in other words, the internal functions do not have to be bijective).
This is also handy in practice, because it makes the decryption process very similar to the
encryption process.
Classically, Theorem 3 states that a 3-round Feistel network constitutes a cryptographi-
cally secure pseudorandom permutation as long as the internal functions are pseudorandom
as well. That is, a polynomial-time classical distinguisher cannot distinguish a 3-round Feistel
network from a random permutation, see Section 2 for formal definitions and statements of
this classical result. Quantumly, this implication does not hold, and in this section we show
a polynomial-time quantum attacker which can distinguish a 3-round Feistel network (with
internal random functions) from a fully random permutation. Our proof follows the lines of
the results by Kuwakado and Morii [KM10]. The main difference is that they assume the
internal functions of the Feistel network to be permutations, while here we can handle the
more general scenario of arbitrary (random) functions.
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L0 R0
⊕
P1
⊕
P2
⊕
P3
L3 R3
L1
L2
R1
R2
Fig. 1. A three-round Feistel network with internal functions P1, P2, P3.
In this scenario, a distinguishing adversary has an oracle V : {0, 1}2n → {0, 1}2n which is
either a fully random permutation of 2n-bit strings, or a 3-round Feistel network with internal
random functions P1, P2, P3, that is
V (a||c) = c⊕ P2(a⊕ P1(c)) || a⊕ P1(c)⊕ P3(c⊕ P2(a⊕ P1(c))) .
Let W : {0, 1}2n → {0, 1}n be the first n bits of V : W (a||c) = c ⊕ P2(a ⊕ P1(c)). Let
α, β ∈ {0, 1}n be distinct fixed strings, and let us consider the function f : {0, 1}n+1 → {0, 1}n
defined as
f(b||a) :=
{
W (a||α) ⊕ α if b = 0
W (a||β) ⊕ β if b = 1
for all b ∈ {0, 1} and a ∈ {0, 1}n. In case V is the Feistel network, we have
f(b||a) =
{
α⊕ P2(a⊕ P1(α))⊕ α if b = 0
β ⊕ P2(a⊕ P1(β)) ⊕ β if b = 1
=
{
P2(a⊕ P1(α)) if b = 0
P2(a⊕ P1(β)) if b = 1
.
For each y in the image img(P2) of P2, denote its pre-image by P
−1
2 (y) = {x1, . . . , xly},
we have
f(b||a) = y
⇔ b||a ∈ {0||xi ⊕ P1(α)}i=1...ly ∪ {1||xi ⊕ P1(β)}i=1...ly
= {a1, . . . , aly} ∪ {a1 ⊕ s, . . . , aly ⊕ s}
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where s = 1||(P1(α)⊕ P1(β)) and ai = 0||(xi ⊕ P1(α)) for i = 1 . . . ly. In particular, in case V
is a Feistel network, for each u ∈ {0, 1}n+1, we have f(u) = f(u⊕ s). On the other hand, in
case V is a random permutation, no such relation is expected to hold.
Using at most two invocations of the unitary operator UV : |x, y〉 7→ |x, y ⊕ V (x)〉 for
computing V , we can construct the unitary operator Uf : |u, y〉 7→ |u, y ⊕ f(u)〉. Using this
operator, one can mount the following attack, based on Simon’s algorithm, to distinguish
whether V is a random permutation or a 3-round Feistel network:
1. Initialize X as the empty set.
2. Run Simon’s subroutine:
|0〉 /n+1 H⊗n+1
Uf
H⊗n+1 j
|0〉 /n
3. Add the result j = (j0, j1, . . . , jn) to X . If X does not contain n linearly independent
j’s, go back to Step 2, unless X already contains 2n elements. In the latter case, guess
V to be a 3-round Feistel network. Otherwise, solve this linear system of equations:

 |j1 . . . jn
|




s1
...
sn

 =

 |j0
|


4. Choose u ∈ {0, 1}n+1 at random, and guess V to be a 3-round Feistel network if f(u) =
f(u⊕ s), where s = (1, s1, . . . , sn). Otherwise guess V to be a random permutation.
Let us first analyze the case when V is a 3-round Feistel network. After applying Uf , we
have the state
1√
2n+1
∑
u∈{0,1}n+1
|u, f(u)〉 = 1√
2n+1
∑
y∈img(P2)
ly∑
i=1
(|ai〉+ |ai ⊕ s〉) |y〉 .
Before measuring, we get
1
2n+1
∑
y∈img(P2)
ly∑
i=1
( ∑
j∈{0,1}n+1
(−1)ai·j |j〉+
∑
j∈{0,1}n+1
(−1)(ai⊕s)·j |j〉
)
|y〉
=
1
2n+1
∑
y∈img(P2)
∑
j∈{0,1}n+1
ly∑
i=1
(−1)ai·j(1 + (−1)s·j) |j〉 |y〉
=
1
2n
∑
y∈img(P2)
( ∑
j∈{0,1}n+1
s·j=0
( ly∑
i=1
(−1)ai·j
)
|j〉
)
|y〉 .
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Hence, all measurement outcomes j satisfy s · j = 0 mod 2, so if at some point we solve
the system in Step 3 we get (s1, . . . , sn) = P1(α)⊕ P1(β), and the condition f(u) = f(u⊕ s)
in Step 4 is satisfied for all u ∈ {0, 1}n+1, so the algorithm gives the correct answer. If we
do not reach the step of solving the system because after collecting 2n vectors we still do not
have n independent vectors, then we give the correct answer because we will guess V to be
the 3-round Feistel network.
If V is a random permutation, then the j’s will be uniform random vectors. In that
case, we make an error if we do not have n independent vectors after 2n extractions, or if
f(u) = f(u ⊕ s) in Step 4. Notice that the probability that after 2n extractions of uniform
vectors, we still do not have n independent vectors is negligible in n.fIn case we continue to
solve a random system of independent equations in Step 3, we get a random vector s1, . . . , sn
as a result. Then, at Step 4, the algorithmmakes an error if the randomly chosen u ∈ {0, 1}n+1
satisfies the condition f(u) = f(u⊕ s), but this also happens only with negligible probability.
So we conclude that also if V is a random permutation, the algorithm gives a wrong answer
by guessing it to be a 3-round Feistel network with only negligible probability.
In summary, we have constructed a quantum adversary which can efficiently distinguish a
3-round Feistel construction with internal functions from a fully random permutation. This
extends the results from [KM10] to the important setting where a Feistel construction is used
to turn pseudorandom functions into pseudorandom permutations.
4 Quantum forgery attack on CBC-MAC
The goal of message authentication and integrity is to allow communicating parties to verify
that a received message comes from the expected sender, and that the message has not
been altered in transit. Parties who share a secret key can use Message Authentication
Codes (MACs) to achieve this goal: the sender feeds the key k and the message m to an
algorithm Mac(k,m) which computes a tag t for the message, and sends the pair (m, t) to
the receiver. Then the receiver, using the same key k, can check whether t is a valid tag for
m. A message authentication code is considered secure if no efficient adversary who can ask
arbitrary adaptive queries to the oracle Mac(k, ·) (where k is uniform and unknown to the
adversary) can produce a valid tag for a message m that has not been queried before.
CBC-MAC is an efficient way of constructing a message authentication code based on
a pseudorandom permutation (formally defined in Section 2). CBC-MAC is widely used in
practice, and comes in many variants. Given a pseudorandom permutation F : K×{0, 1}n →
{0, 1}n, the basic CBC-MAC construction is defined as
CBCℓ : K × {0, 1}ℓn → {0, 1}n
(k,m1||m2|| . . . ||mℓ) 7→ CBCℓFk(m1||m2|| . . . ||mℓ) ,
where
CBCℓFk(m1||m2|| . . . ||mℓ) = Fk(Fk(. . . Fk(Fk(m1)⊕m2)⊕ . . . )⊕mℓ) .
fThis can be proven as follows: the probability that n uniform vectors of length 2n are linearly independent is
exactly Πni=1(1− 2
i−1−2n) ≥ 1− 2−n. In other words, the column rank of a random binary 2n× n matrix is
n except with probability at most 2−n. The claim then follows directly from the equality of row and column
rank, see e.g. [War05].
10 Using Simon’s algorithm to attack symmetric-key cryptographic primitives
Fk Fk Fk
⊕ ⊕
m1 m2 m3
t
Fig. 2. Illustration of the computation of t = CBC3Fk
(m1||m2||m3).
The case ℓ = 3 is depicted in Figure 2.
Using this construction, a sender who wants to send a messagem of length ℓn can compute
a tag t := CBCℓ(k,m) and send the tuple (m, t) to the receiver who can verify whether
t = CBCℓ(k,m).
One can prove that CBCℓ is a pseudorandom function. Therefore, as explained in [BKR00],
it (classically) constitutes a secure MAC. Quantumly, even if F is a quantum-secure pseudo-
random permutation, this construction does not yield a secure MAC, and not even a quantum
pseudorandom function (qPRF) as defined in Section 2.
According to the definition given in [BZ13a], a signature scheme is quantum secure if there
is no quantum attacker who can produce q + 1 valid tags by making only q queries. This
notion of security is also the one used in [KLLNP16]. In this work, we use a different notion
of security. Namely, we show how to forge a valid tag for a chosen-prefix message without
ever querying that particular message (not even as small part of a big superposition query).
We note that basic CBC-MAC is only secure for fixed-length messages, but fails in case the
attacker is allowed to query and forge different-length messages. However, we would like to
stress that our quantum attack does not rely on that weakness, but also breaks the extension
of CBC-MAC where the length of the messages is prepended. This extension can be proven
secure classically.
In the following, we describe our forgery attack on CBC-MAC for messages of fixed length
ℓn, where ℓ ≥ 3. We want to forge a tag for a message which has some fixed prefix β ∈ {0, 1}kn
of length kn for some k ≤ ℓ − 2. For simplicity, we restrict ourselves to the case k = 1. In
Section 4.1, we explain how to extend the attack to prefixes of arbitrary size k ≤ ℓ− 2.
In a first step, we assume that the pseudorandom permutation Fk is replaced with a fully
random permutation π. If this replacement made a difference in our forging algorithm, then
this difference would allow us to use our algorithm to distinguish Fk from a fully random
permutation, in contradiction with the fact that F is a qPRF.
Suppose we want to tag a message having α1 ∈ {0, 1}n as a prefix. Choose some α0 6= α1.
For j = 1 . . . ℓ − 1, let us consider the following functions:
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gj :{0, 1}n+1 → {0, 1}n
b||x 7→ CBCℓπ(αb||0(j−1)n||x||0(ℓ−j−1)n) = πℓ−j(πj(αb)⊕ x)
Note that, for distinct u, v ∈ {0, 1}n+1, we have gj(u) = gj(v) if and only if v = u ⊕
1||(πj(α0)⊕ πj(α1)).
Using one invocation of the unitary operator UCBCℓπ we can construct the unitary operator
Ugj , for j = 1 . . . ℓ − 1. A quantum adversary can use these operators to forge a tag on a
message without querying it as follows:
1. For j = 1 . . . ℓ − 1, run Simon’s subroutine on Ugj in order to find zj := πj(α0) ⊕
πj(α1).
gNote that all queries made in this process are on (superpositions of) messages
m1||m2|| . . . ||mℓ such that mi = 0n for at least one i ∈ {1 . . . ℓ} h.
2. Classically query t0 := CBC
ℓ
π(α0||0(ℓ−1)n) = πℓ(α0) and t1 := CBCℓπ(α1||0(ℓ−1)n) =
πℓ(α1).
Also these queries are made on messages m1||m2|| . . . ||mℓ such that mi = 0n for at least
one i ∈ {1 . . . ℓ}.
3. If ℓ is even, forge (m, t) := (α1||z1||z2|| . . . ||zℓ−1, t0). If ℓ is odd, forge (m, t) := (α1||z1||z2|| . . . ||zℓ−1, t1).
The message m = α1||z1||z2|| . . . ||zℓ−1 is never queried in the above procedure, where we
query only messages m1||m2|| . . . ||mℓ such that mi = 0n for at least one i ∈ {1 . . . ℓ}. In fact,
as the πi are permutations, we have zj = πj(α0)⊕ πj(α1) 6= 0n for all j’s.
Therefore, in order to show that the above forging attack is successful, it remains to prove
that t is a valid tag for m, which means that CBCℓπ(m) = t, where t = t0 = π
ℓ(α0) if ℓ is even
and t = t1 = π
ℓ(α1) if ℓ is odd. This claim is proven by induction on ℓ ≥ 3:
We have two base cases, ℓ = 3 and ℓ = 4. For ℓ = 3 we have:
CBC3π(α1||z1||z2) = π(π(π(α1)⊕ z1)⊕ z2)
= π
(
π (π(α1)⊕ π(α0)⊕ π(α1))⊕ π2(α0)⊕ π2(α1)
)
= π((π2(α0)⊕ π2(α0)⊕ π2(α1)) = π3(α1) = t1 .
For ℓ = 4 we similarly argue that
CBC4π(α1||z1||z2||z3) = π(π(π(π(α1)⊕ z1)⊕ z2)⊕ z3)
= π
(
π(π(π(α1)⊕ π(α0)⊕ π(α1))⊕ π2(α0)⊕ π2(α1))⊕ π3(α0)⊕ π3(α1)
)
= π(π(π2(α0)⊕ π2(α0)⊕ π2(α1))⊕ π3(α0)⊕ π3(α1))
= π(π3(α1)⊕ π3(α0)⊕ π3(α1)) = π4(α0) = t0 .
gThis step of the algorithm shows that also for the case ℓ = 2, CBCℓπ is not a quantum pseudorandom
permutation: We can run Simon’s algorithm with g1 (which exists also in the case ℓ = 2) to get a solution
1||z1. Then, we pick u at random and check if g1(u) = g1(u⊕ 1||z1) holds. For CBCℓπ, this will always be the
case, whereas for a fully random permutation, the check will only be passed with negligible probability.
hThis would not be the case for ℓ = 2, which is why we require ℓ ≥ 3 for the attack.
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If ℓ+ 1 is even then ℓ is odd, and the induction step works as
CBCℓ+1π (α1||z1||z2|| . . . ||zℓ−1||zℓ)
= π(CBCℓπ(α1||z1||z2|| . . . ||zℓ−1)⊕ zℓ)
= π(πℓ(α1)⊕ πℓ(α0)⊕ πℓ(α1)) = πℓ+1(α0) = t0 .
Otherwise, if ℓ+ 1 is odd, then ℓ is even and one can argue similarly that
CBCℓ+1π (α1||z1||z2|| . . . ||zℓ−1||zℓ)
= π(CBCℓπ(α1||z1||z2|| . . . ||zℓ−1)⊕ zℓ)
= π(πℓ(α0)⊕ πℓ(α0)⊕ πℓ(α1)) = πℓ+1(α1) = t1 .
Thus, we can conclude by induction that the output pair (m, t) is correct.
4.1 Extension of the Attack on CBC-MAC
The algorithm presented in this section can be adapted for forging a tag for a message having
arbitrary β1|| · · · ||βk ∈ {0, 1}kn as a prefix, for some k ≤ ℓ− 2.
Choose α1|| · · · ||αk such that
α := π(· · ·π(π(α1)⊕ α2) · · · )⊕ αk 6= π(· · ·π(π(β1)⊕ β2) · · · )⊕ βk =: β .
This inequality can be achieved by repeatedly choosing α1|| · · · ||αk at random and query-
ing CBCℓπ(α1|| · · · ||αk||0(ℓ−k)n) = πℓ−k
(
π(π(· · · π(π(α1) ⊕ α2) · · · ) ⊕ αk)
)
= πℓ−k(π(α)) =
πℓ−k+1(α) and CBCℓπ(β1|| · · · ||βk||0(ℓ−k)n) = πℓ−k
(
π(π(· · · π(π(β1)⊕β2) · · · )⊕βk)
)
= πℓ−k(π(β)) =
πℓ−k+1(β) until πℓ−k+1(α) and πℓ−k+1(β) are different (which will already be the case after
a single try except with negligible probability). Then, since πℓ−k+1(α) 6= πℓ−k+1(β), we must
also have α 6= β.
We have
CBCℓπ(α1|| · · · ||αk||0(ℓ−k)n) = CBCℓ−k+1π (α||0(ℓ−k)n)
and similarly
CBCℓπ(β1|| · · · ||βk||0(ℓ−k)n) = CBCℓ−k+1π (β||0(ℓ−k)n) .
So, for j = 1 . . . ℓ − k we define
gj : {0, 1}n+1 → {0, 1}n
b||x 7→
{
CBCℓπ(α1|| · · · ||αk||0(j−1)n||x||0(ℓ−k−j)n) if b = 0
CBCℓπ(β1|| · · · ||βk||0(j−1)n||x||0(ℓ−k−j)n) if b = 1
=
{
CBCℓ−k+1π (α||0(j−1)n||x||0(ℓ−k−j)n) if b = 0
CBCℓ−k+1π (β||0(j−1)n||x||0(ℓ−k−j)n) if b = 1
=
{
πℓ−k+1−j(πj(α)⊕ x) if b = 0
πℓ−k+1−j(πj(β)⊕ x) if b = 1 .
Then we can run the algorithm from Section 4 because ℓ − k + 1 ≥ 3. Thereby, we obtain
a tag for the message m = β1|| · · · ||βk||z1|| · · · ||zℓ−k, where zj = πj(α) ⊕ πj(β), and only
(superpositions of) messages with at least one zero-block have been queried in the process.
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5 Conclusion and Open Questions
We have shown two applications of Simon’s algorithm to breaking classical symmetric cryp-
toschemes. As illustrated in the independent work of [KLLNP16], the same attack technique
can be applied in various other cryptographic scenarios as well. These results shed new light
on the post-quantum cryptographic security of classical cryptography and suggest that many
classical security proofs need to be revisited in the light of quantum attackers.
Very recent work by Zhandry [Zha16] shows the existence of quantum-secure pseudo-
random permutations (PRPs). However, the construction does not use Feistel networks.
Therefore, it remains an intriguing open question to prove that a constant number (strictly
larger than 3) of Feistel rounds suffices to obtain a quantum-secure pseudorandom permu-
tation from a quantum secure PRF. In the case of message-authentication codes, our work
suggests that one has to be very careful in using popular constructions such as CBC-MAC.
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